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State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Africa 
Ultima Ratio Regum[1]: Remix or Redux? 
Dylan Craig 
Introduction  
In this article, I am concerned with wartime alliances between states and armed nonstate actors, 
particularly in Africa. Heterogeneous military partnerships of this kind occur throughout the 
historical record. Louis XIV of France, whose aphorism about war and the state provides the title 
of this article, was an enthusiastic user of his enemies’ enemies;[2] but so was Medieval England 
with its Viking honor guard of ‘Thingmen’,[3] and so are the U.S. armed forces, whose Tribal 
Engagement Strategy in Afghanistan involves harnessing sub-state tribal actors to state-level 
reconstruction and security goals.[4] 
Amidst this long history of states using nonstates in war, the practice seems to have found its 
fullest expression in independent Africa. 70 percent of all conflicts producing more than 25 
annual battlefield deaths in Africa since 1946, and 100 percent of the conflicts producing more 
than 1,000 deaths, involved an alliance including one or more nonstate combatant factions.[5] 
These numbers have generated media outcries (such as those aimed at the Sudanese 
government’s use of the Janjaweed), and a variety of tight-focus studies of particular 
partnerships at specific points of time,[6] but little in the way of synthetic work aimed at 
theorizing the phenomenon as a category of war in itself. Why is this? 
Part of the blame must be attributed to our scholarly and professional inability to think our way 
out of the state-centered corner into which our understandings of war have painted us. By this, I 
mean that although we know very well how war came to be dominated by states,[7] we are less 
sure of what direction the reversal of this monopoly will take, or is taking.  
A broad class of literature has grown up around the question, ‘What will the wars of the future 
look like, once states are no longer the only ones fighting?’ Mary Kaldor’s ‘New War’ thesis[8] 
is a well-known member of the class, as are the cluster of works dealing with the ‘Revolution in 
Military Affairs’ (RMA). However; as I have discussed elsewhere,[9] while these models are 
fine as far as they go, they tend either to focus entirely on powerful, legally constituted evolving-
state-at-war (in the case of RMA), or dispense with it entirely by focusing on wars in which the 
state is a blown-out shell inhabited by violent scavengers and warlords (New War).  
Yet in Africa, and perhaps increasingly across the world, the empirical evidence seems to 




violence by adapting its techniques, or losing their monopoly entirely: rather than learning to 
fight ‘smarter’ wars of sabotage and counter-sabotage (as called for in the ‘network war’/RMA 
doctrine), states sometimes outsource this work to non-states. And while the state patrons are 
often weaker relative to their allies than the superpowers were during the Cold War, perhaps 
even reaching the status of ‘failed states’, they are not helpless bystanders to war. Instead, they 
leverage what strengths they do have (such as access to the global market) to make themselves 
an attractive military partner for the non-states in question, and conduct war in that manner. I 
refer to these new configurations, to the transsovereign use of force involving states and non-
state actors, as ‘heterogeneous military partnerships’ (HMPs). 
The question thus becomes: how should we proceed when confronted with a form of war which 
seems to stretch across history, and which is widely represented in contemporary Africa, but 
which is not adequately covered by existing perspectives? In this article, I contribute to one 
necessary aspect of a broader plan of approach: the literature. I ask and answer four questions: 
(1) why is our current stock of literature on military partnerships including non-states insufficient 
to the task of explaining contemporary African conflicts, (2) which other branches of literature 
have attempted to interact with these conflicts, (3) which factors are common enough in these 
other branches, that an eventual theory of heterogeneous military partnerships would do well to 
consider them, and (4) are these beginnings of a theory of proxy war borne out by preliminary 
reference to case study data? 
Answering these four questions is the first step in determining whether Louis XIV’s quote—that 
war is the ‘final argument of kings’—still applies in Africa. Has sovereign war through nonstates 
undergone a significant change in recent history—a ‘remix?’ Or is it the simply an age-old 
technique ‘redux’—that is to say, returned to use? I turn to this question below. 
1. What is a Proxy War[10]? 
During the Cold War, the term ‘proxy war’ was used to refer to the superpowers’ use of allied 
factions or states to pursue their global rivalry outside the strictures of Northern-Hemisphere 
nuclear deterrence. Safire’s Political Dictionary offers the following definition and etymology:  
Great-power hostility expressed through client states. “The first case of a proxy 
war between China and the Soviet Union” was the way National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski described the fighting between Vietnam and Cambodia that 
resulted in a break in relations on New Year's Eve of 1978. He cautioned that the 
two nations had a tradition of enmity, “but the larger international dimension of 
the conflict speaks for itself” … The phrase may be rooted in proxy fight, an 
attempt to get control of a corporate management through a contest for 
stockholders' proxy votes. Proxy war has also been taken to mean both “localized 
conflict” with outside sponsors and “brush-fire war” (a war likely to spread 




Works which deal with conflicts defined in this way, take the ‘what’ is proxy war largely for 
granted and focus on ‘why’ it occurs: for example, why did the United States fund the 
Nicaraguan Contras[12] or the Afghan Mujahideen[13], and why did Cuban forces willingly 
serve as a de facto Soviet expeditionary force in Libya, Ethiopia, Angola and elsewhere?[14] 
In part, this focus is justifiable because of the uniform character of proxy warfare during the 
Cold War, i.e., the provision of military aid and advisors, by one or both superpower blocs, in 
support of local political entrepreneurs like Somalia’s Siad Barre or Angola’s Jonas Savimbi. 
The dominance of these patterns of superpower behavior on the study of proxy war was so 
complete that in his authoritative treatment of South Africa’s sponsorship of rebel groups in 
Angola and Mozambique, William Minter went so far as to propose using the term ‘Contra 
warfare’ (after the US-sponsored Nicaraguan Contras) for all forms of proxy war.[15] 
However, despite the apparent clarity of this definition, there are two obstacles to its continued 
application in contemporary conflict studies: distinguishing proxy relationships from those 
alliance relationships in which one or more parties are stronger than others in the alliance, and 
accounting for the increasing role of nonstate groups in contemporary warfare. 
Alliance Relationships 
In terms of the former challenge: any wartime alliance must, at some point, allocate the military, 
personnel, and material costs of the conflict between the partners. Indeed, when some alliance 
partners are stronger and/or more well-provisioned than others, only one of two outcomes can 
occur: either the stronger party takes the lead (a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ scenario), or it does 
not. If it does not, this may be because:  
(i) it is politically expedient to allocate some regions, operations or responsibilities to the 
militarily less powerful partners in the alliance (as occurred in the Allied forces 
during the closing years of World War Two),  
(ii) the geographic spread of the fighting is such that only some partners are proximal to 
the military tasks at hand , or  
(iii) of the comparative advantages in terms of troop availability versus war production 
capability suggest a commensurate division of troop vs. logistical support for joint 
actions. 
What I believe these likely scenarios underscore, is the weakness of building a model of proxy 
wars purely based on the ‘why’ aspect of the alliances involved. To do so runs the risk of 
rendering the category analytically useless by expanding it to include all wars. World War One 
thus becomes a ‘proxy war’ in which a Russo-Austro-Hungarian conflict over Serbia draws in 
sponsoring forces from (among others) France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United 
States. And this, in turn, provokes a category problem: while it is certainly legitimate to ask, 
‘why did Germany support Austria-Hungary?’ in the much same way as we might ask, ‘Why did 




War One belongs in the same category as the Vietnam war, the Angolan Civil War, and the Bay 
of Pigs invasion.  
A further complicating factor related to partnerships between the weak and strong has to do with 
the fact that it is not always easy to identify ‘who’ is fighting as whose ‘proxy.’ In his book on 
proxy warfare through military intervention, which features entire chapters devoted to typologies 
of intervention and levels of support, Bertil Dunér is forced to gloomily conclude that ‘it may 
also be that proxy interventions have never happened’ (my emphasis),[17] specifically because it 
is so hard to discount the buy-in of the weaker party in assessing why and how the war 
proceeded. This, in turn, makes the very idea that one party was a ‘client’ of another, hard to 
sustain.  
Non-state Actors 
The difficulty of distinguishing a proxy relationship from a strong-weak alliance provides a 
considerable roadblock to studying proxy war as such. However, beyond this roadblock lies 
another: the problem of non-state actors. As outlined above, the sense of ‘proxy war’ which we 
derive from its Cold War depiction, has a strongly statist element. This was true even when some 
of the factions involved were non-state actors, e.g. the Contras or the Mujahideen, because in 
most of these conflicts the goal continued to be (eventual) control of the state.  However, the role 
of non-state actors has changed, I would argue, not only in scope but also in nature since the end 
of the Cold War.[18] The root of this change can be seen in the transformations in sovereignty 
which have come with globalization.[19] Where revolutionaries (or, counter-revolutionaries) 
once struggled to capture the state, many contemporary non-state actors are content to simply 
evade or roll back the state. These quasi-sovereign political units leverage global communication 
networks and an open market for gray (or even completely illegal) goods, in order to translate 
their access to lootable resources and/or exploitable populations, into even more coercive power 
via the purchase of arms or the hiring of mercenaries.[20] 
This evolution of the self-sufficient non-state has had several effects on the definition and study 
‘proxy war.’ First, it complicates the notion of intra-state war, in that all civil wars can no longer 
necessarily be assumed to have regime change as an objective. The proxy warfare conducted 
between the United States, Soviet bloc, and China was primarily a king-making endeavor, i.e. 
aimed at establishing or obstructing the incumbency of local factions depending on the alignment 
they brought, or would bring upon taking power, to the state in question. In contrast, as 
mentioned above, modern non-state proxies may not have conventional agendas regarding the 
sovereign dispensations of the areas in which they operate. This means that to study modern 
proxy warfare, we have to be able to move beyond the Cold War scenario of ‘sponsoring power 
A ensures the incumbency of faction B,’ to a more nuanced one; and this, in turn, means that the 
literature to consult must be broadened. In the preliminary analysis of data, below, I will refer to 
the transsovereign use of force involving states and non-state actors, and to the ‘heterogeneous 
military partnerships’ mentioned in the introduction. I clarify my choice of relevant literature in 




2. Applicable Fields of Literature for Studying Proxy Wars 
As I have discussed above, despite the lack of a coherent baseline definition of proxy war,[21] 
certain contextual features of the Cold War geopolitical environment have left a significant 
imprint on our understanding of the category. Primarily, these imprints fall under two headings: 
first, the assumption that a clear proxy-client gradient, based on power levels, is apparent within 
the alliance responsible for the proxy war; and second, that the actors involved are either 
superpowers, client states, or factions that wish to become client states.  
At the same time, I have presented an initial, non-empirical problematization of these 
assumptions; i.e., first, that power relations between alliance partners may not be a useful way 
of creating a coherent category for further study. Second, if and when the dominant 
configuration of sovereign power in conflict areas changes with globalization, so too may the 
goals and means of those at war: in particular, non-state actors. Taken together, these serve as an 
initial guide for a further search through a substantial body of conflict studies literature. In 
particular, the following seem central to the study of modern proxy war:  
1. Power: This perhaps overly sketchy outline regarding power highlights: The further 
examination of proxy war requires an examination of the configurations of power in the sites 
of interest. What is power? What sets ‘powerful’ actors apart from less powerful ones? How 
do they project that power? How is this different from the Cold War standard? And how, 
then, might this affect the use of proxy war by the ‘contextually strong?’[22] 
2. Sovereignty: The forms of sovereignty employed by the actors, how the diversification of 
sovereign forms affects the potential war aims of proxy war combatants.[23] 
It is also worth noting that the empirical reality of the kinds of wars I am interested in also brings 
on board three other fields of literature in addition to power and sovereignty. The former will 
allow me to draw a clearer distinction between the relevant wars and others kinds of violence, 
while the study of power and sovereignty will serve as a theoretical frame for defining the object 
of study more precisely.  Given the scope of the present article, I focus here on the literature that 
allows me to distinguish my object of study. 
The following three fields of literature are proposed: studies that focus on military interventions 
and the factors which provoke or encourage them, studies focusing on violent trans-border 
criminal networks and the civil wars exploited by the corrupt governments of geographically 
contiguous states, and finally studies examining those who fight, with a focus on revolutionary 
ideologies such as pan-Africanism or pan-Arabism, and revolutionary figures such as Muammar 
al-Gaddafi and Che Guevara. Each of these fields of literature directly addresses, as I will show, 
issues of power (both concrete and social) and sovereignty, and each focuses on different aspects 
of the kind of event we wish to study as proxy wars.  




Proxy warfare and military intervention are closely related, and the literature on military 
interventions (MIs) confirms that issues of power projection and sovereignty are crucial for 
understanding the kinds of event upon which proxy war studies might also focus. Like a proxy 
war, military intervention involves the projection of forces belonging to one state (or to an 
intergovernmental organization, or ‘IGO’, like the United Nations), into the sovereign territory 
of another state.[24] When this occurs in the context of an ongoing conflict with visible factions 
or a range of combatant groups, such as a civil war, interveners may try to not pick sides; but just 
as often, they in fact do pick sides, or at least are widely suspected to have done so. In such 
cases, the boundary between intervention and the pursuit of military goals through a local 
intermediary (i.e. proxy war, loosely defined) becomes blurred. Examples of the latter kind of 
intervention-alliance in Africa are: the Rwandan intervention in Zaire during the First Congo 
War,[25] the Tanzanian invasion of Idi Amin’s Uganda,[26] and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia.[27] Examples of what may be termed 
‘fair-minded interventions’ include the 1993 UN mission to Somalia (UNOSOM),[28] and the 
1997 Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention in Lesotho.[29] 
There are several ways to define a military intervention legalistically, i.e. based on the 
plausibility of the intervening state’s claim that it serves a legitimate purpose. However, I am 
inclined to argue that it would be more useful to us as scholars to recognize MIs as, essentially, 
an exercise in sovereignty creation or re-creation. Interveners, whether they are states or IGOs, 
are bound to impose some form of de facto sovereignty (no matter how temporary, or insufficient 
to the task[30]) over the occupied territory or invaded country.[31] They may do this to 
circumvent the target state’s inability to see to the welfare of its citizens (e.g., humanitarian 
intervention after a natural disaster), they may do it to confront the state and prevent or halt some 
aspects of its domestic policies (e.g., peace-making operations, the defense of election monitors, 
or responses to genocide[32]), or—in the most extreme cases—they may do it to revoke an 
illegitimate regime’s authority (and hence its sovereignty) entirely, and depose its leaders.  
All three of these forms of intervention involve an imposition of the kinds of benefits ideally 
attached to the social contract; in other words, the provision of the kinds of collective goods 
(infrastructure, common defense) usually provided by the state to its citizens. When these goods 
are provided by a group other than the government, such as the intervening force, it calls the 
state itself into question, and suggests that its sovereignty has been circumscribed; it is no 
coincidence that the creation of liberated zones, from which the state has been expelled, is a 
fundamental of classical revolutionary strategy.[33] 
Given this consensus in the literature on military intervention, it seems clear that configurations 
of sovereignty, the attempt to legitimize power projection, and the forms of alliance chosen 
between interveners and local actors are all significant issues in studying those complex conflicts 
which we might also investigate as examples of heterogeneous military partnerships at war. 
However, MIs of this form all involve overt involvement, where many HMPs  have a partially 
(or entirely) covert nature. To better understand the dynamics of covert and illegal intervention, I 




2.2 Violent criminal networks 
Beyond the literature on MIs, there are many useful analyses of partnerships between states 
exterior to a particular war, and those factions (whether state or non-state) actually caught up in 
the fighting. Once again, this seems a similar kind of phenomenon to proxy warfare; and once 
again, issues of what constitutes power and sovereignty are highlighted as issues which a study 
of proxy warfare would have to take into account. 
In studies of violent criminal networks, what is most at stake in the decision to support a faction 
fighting in some foreign war is the potential monetary benefit the sponsoring state is able to 
derive from illegal trade with that faction. This process can be depicted as follows: first, a 
nonstate actor (who is party to none of the prohibition regimes states may be signatories to)[34] 
conducts some kind of illegal activity such as the harvesting of ivory or alluvial diamonds. The 
plunderers now have a cache of illegal goods, while states have the capacity both to inject these 
goods onto the world markets, and to forge or fake registration certificates, statements of 
provenance, and end-user certificates so that the goods can go from being illegal, to being semi- 
or fully legal commodities.[35] 
The trade between the sponsor state and the proxy group can thus proceed on the following 
terms: the proxies receive whatever goods and services the sponsoring state is willing to part 
with (such as weapons diverted from national armories, kickbacks from the sales themselves, or 
other rewards), while the sponsor gets foreign exchange from selling the commodities; both 
parties are assured of a profitable outcome—as long as the proxy’s access to illegal goods is 
ensured. However, in helping the proxy group maintain this access, the sponsor often becomes 
an accessory to state failure or civil war. This happens when the plunderers compete with the 
target state for access to the resources in question (e.g., the diamond fields), and this competition 
develops into civil violence or war.[36] It is for this reason that states like Uganda and Guinea, 
who show willingness to process black-market goods derived from ongoing conflicts throughout 
Africa, have repeatedly been accused of perpetuating and exacerbating civil wars and political 
repression by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or IGOs. As long as these states provide 
a market for conflict goods stemming from rebel groups, the reasoning goes, they give those 
parties a stake in avoiding a peace settlement.[37] 
It is also worth noting that this kind of foreign involvement has at times provoked retaliation by 
the targeted state. Angola, for instance, intervened in both Zaire and the Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville) in order to topple regimes which had been selling diamonds on behalf of the Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels it was fighting.[38] Wars connected to 
criminal enterprise therefore pose a serious threat to regional peace, both for the targeted state 
and the sponsoring state, should the target state decide to retaliate. Studies of such wars also 
show many points of potential contact with the study of proxy warfare. Certainly, they confirm 
that power (primarily, here, economic power) is an important dimension for understanding the 
illegal transborder projection of force-by-proxy. Furthermore, because control of resources 




faction or proxy, they reaffirm the importance of examining the use of sovereign space in 
conflicts. However, these studies fail to directly address the role of ideology in sustaining some 
wars where no profit motive is apparent. In order to address this shortfall, another branch of 
applicable literature is required. 
2.3 Those who fight: revolutionary ideologies 
The third applicable perspective to the delineation of a distinct category, or object of study: 
proxy wars involve the study of revolutionary ideologies and violent networks. These kinds of 
study are concerned with those who fight, i.e. those who constitute the ground troops of the 
conflicts we might study as proxy wars, what motivates them and their commanders, and where 
they come from. This, in turn, connects to the study of proxy wars by explaining how the many 
and varied alternatives to state armies (e.g. mercenaries, militarized traditional communities, and 
armed refugees) come into existence and become available to serve the purposes of sponsoring 
states. 
I include under this heading (a) studies of the propagation of transnational revolutionary 
ideologies; (b) studies within the subfield of transitional justice and peace building, which focus 
on the effective demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants; and 
(c) studies of mercenarism. However, in the interests of brevity, I only examine revolutionary 
ideology in this article.  
Revolutionary ideology has proven a powerful force in provoking, and shaping the eventual form 
of, some of the most significant mass-violence events of recent years. In the Middle East, we 
have the example of Iraq, in which a significant transsovereign jihadist insurgency took root 
soon after the fall of the Ba’athist regime. In Africa, prominent historical examples include the 
support given to the African National Congress  (ANC)[39] by the Frontline states between 1961 
and 1994,[40] the dissemination of insurgents throughout Africa from the late 1970s under 
Muammar al-Gaddafi’s ‘Third Universal Principle’,[41] and the Islamicist support given to 
foreign Mujahideen operating in Somalia and Ethiopia from the 1980s onwards.[42] 
Two recurrent themes characterize studies of these events. First, it appears that states choose to 
support such revolutionary ideologies as a result of processes on the domestic and international 
levels alike. For example, Zambia’s adoption of a strongly supportive stance towards the 
outlawed ANC was the result of pressure on the (generally moderate) Kenneth Kaunda from the 
Organization of African Unity, his fellow southern African heads of state, and the militant 
Zambian student movement. To some extent, Kaunda courted this pressure, but some of it was 
unanticipated, and Kaunda merely reacted to its application.[43] Any analysis of this 
commitment should thus be conducted both in foreign and domestic policy terms, and in a way 
which assesses the extent to which the state controlled discourse in these fora. [44]  
Second, it is clear that joining a revolutionary transnational cause gives states a rich opportunity 




even more so when the ‘call to arms’ is couched in transcendent and/or originary terms (e.g. 
religious or civil-religious ideologies),[45] because participating in such a narration pins the 
state’s legitimacy to a higher cause and insulates it from specific forms of criticism.[46] This is 
not the same as the domestic or international pressure mentioned above; and without getting into 
a discussion of whether it is the state, the nation, or the regime which is being narrated through 
the act of joining a cause, the salience of the ideological dimension in this aspect of proxy war is 
nonetheless clear. 
Studies of revolutionary ideology clearly have much to say on the themes of power and 
sovereignty. Primarily, they lay bare the social dimension of power, and the potency of ideology 
as a cause and constraint to war; secondly, because of their generally transnational and/or 
transsovereign character, they highlight the importance of these non- or post-state dimensions in 
explaining the relationships which produce modern proxy war.  
2.4 Drawing the threads together 
The purpose of the review conducted above was to show the points of reference provided to a 
study of heterogeneous military partnerships, by the related studies of MIs, criminal networks, 
and revolutionary ideologies. These three bodies of literature, although they approach the 
conflicts from different directions, all highlight the crucial interplay between power and 
sovereignty in the causes, course and outcomes of these complex conflicts. The reader should 
recall, too, that power and sovereignty also formed a component of the existing literature on 
‘proxy war’ (see p. 8). Although the creation of a true model of African conflict lies beyond the 
scope of this article, we can therefore consider power and sovereignty as useful tools [47] with 
which to approach data from wars of interest.  
3. A Preliminary Sweep through the Data 
A variety of forms of data are available on proxy war. However, because of the lack of a 
exhaustive and generally agreed-on definition of the concept, the list of possible cases generated 
by the data sources is not uniform. For example, although it does not strictly discuss ‘proxy war,’ 
the UCDP data set lists 20 African civil wars which involved an external intervening power.[48] 
This is a good start; however, it is also less than half the number of incidents that could be 
discussed as proxy wars, according to my initial review of secondary literature.[49] Furthermore, 
few of the significant African conflicts now being discussed in terms of proxy war, are 
represented in the UCDP data.[50] It therefore appears that until the concept of proxy war is 
more clearly operationalized (a task which this article is intended to contribute to), the study of 
proxy war must proceed on a ‘best example’ basis. Consequently, I have chosen to limit my 
study to post-independence African states in general, and South Africa in particular.  




South Africa between 1960 and 1994, with an in-depth focus on the years between 1975 and 
1988, is an appropriate formal unit of analysis[51] because its repeated use of proxy warfare 
from the early 1970s onwards occurred despite its ready access to other ways of waging war. 
Specifically: throughout the 1970s and 80s, South Africa had a large, increasingly well-
equipped, and appropriately configured state apparatus with which to conduct war, but instead of 
relying only on this, it also chose to employ non-state actors for proxy warfare.  
South Africa was also, at the time (a) not a global power, (b) operating under a mix of strategic 
advantages (well funded, modern army) and limitations (high casualty sensitivity), (c) possessed 
of a ruling regime with a strong interest in ideological manipulation and propaganda.[52] As a 
formal unit for a case study method, South Africa thus seems fitting example, specifically in 
regards to those elements of the non-Cold War proxy war discussed in 2. and 3. above.[53] 
3.2. South Africa’s ‘Border War’: States and Nonstates mix in an Extrasovereign Space 
In its search for regional and domestic security, the South African Apartheid regime and its 
security forces, along with various nonstate allies, conducted both internal and external 
military/paramilitary joint operations from the early 1960s right up to the democratic transition 
of 1994.[54] Although these operations grew from and fed into one another, sharing both 
personnel and practices, the largest and possibly most significant of them all was the 1975 
invasion, and subsequent partial occupation, of Angola. This operation, code-named 
SAVANNAH, was intended to displace the pro-Soviet Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) faction from its dominant position on the eve of Angolan independence and replace 
them with a pro-Western (and, by extension, pro-South African) coalition composed of União 
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Central Intelligence Agency-
backed National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA).[55] In failing to achieve this goal, 
Operation SAVANNAH precipitated a hardline takeover within the South African security 
forces, and committed the South African Defence Force (SADF) to fifteen years of occupation 
and illegal military activity in and around the nebulous border region. 
After SAVANNAH, UNITA forces (backed by the SADF) held a broad strip along the Angolan-
South African border, which was designated ‘1 Military Region.’ This was a space from which 
Angolan sovereignty, in its de facto sense, had been pushed back—without the explicit 
introduction of South African sovereignty (whether juridical or empirical) to replace it. Being 
neither ‘Angola’ nor ‘South Africa,’ these regions thus constituted an extra-sovereign space in 
which South Africa and its proxies could operate (mostly) as they wished.  
My initial survey of the data suggests that similar extra-sovereign spaces were created through 
military action in the ‘self-governing homelands,’ in Mozambique, and even to some extent in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These were regions controlled and patrolled not only by the proxy forces 
themselves, but also by SADF special forces, paramilitarized police forces (like the infamous 
‘Koevoet’), tribal auxiliaries (such as those based out of the SADF’s ‘Bushman town’ of Camp 




‘Buffalo Battalion,’ and poaching squads connected to a state-sponsored gray market in ivory 
and diamonds.[57] 
At the same time as these extrasovereign spaces were being created outside its borders, the 
Apartheid state was strongly resisting their development within South Africa. Most specifically, 
this meant reacting to a growing insecurity in some border regions, which had driven landowners 
to the cities and left their border farms unoccupied. It was feared that these unsupervised farms, 
often large ranches directly abutting the border, would become points of infiltration for ANC 
guerrillas and arms smugglers. As early as 1979, the South African Deputy Minister of Defence 
warned that, “[if] there is no physical presence of our people, if our flag does not fly there, it is 
an indication of our inability to maintain ourselves there.”[58] The resulting Promotion of the 
Density of Population in Designated Areas Bill implemented subsidies for land purchase in 
border areas, and militarized returning farmers to turn them into a ‘first line of defence’ for the 
regular armed forces.[59] 
As this mix of official and unofficial ‘agents of the state’ did their work on either side of the 
South African border, the Apartheid military planners were busily attending to the war’s 
ideological front. Domestically, the white electorate had to be convinced that the war was worth 
fighting (i.e., tied to domestic issues), and that it was winnable; internationally, the conflict had 
to be legitimised as being in the best interests of (a) the region, and/or (b) the Western world as a 
whole.[60] 
In addition, far from being treated as a dirty secret, UNITA was being built up as a worthwhile 
ally whose continued existence was crucial to regional stability. UNITA’s illegality was glossed 
over entirely in official forums: instead, the South African press asked “How close is UNITA to 
getting power?,”[61] and provided a forum in which UNITA’s leaders could claim that their 
victories had taken place without South African assistance.[62] 
However much South Africa’s nonstate allies may have wished to deny or minimise South 
African support; however, this support was both considerable and crucial to the continued 
existence of factions such as UNITA and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).  
William Minter’s analysis of ‘Apartheid’s Contras’ reveals a pattern of military and material aid 
which clearly display South Africa’s commitment to its proxy wars. Of the two organizations, 
RENAMO was run relatively cheaply;[63] but UNITA received nothing less than the best, with 
SADF funds and stocks being used to outfit UNITA troops, establish and maintain Savimbi’s 
extensive headquarters at Jamba, and even run UNITA’s propaganda radio station, The Voice of 
the Resistance of the Black Cockerel (VORGAN).[64] South Africa also provided Special 
Forces, air, armor and artillery support to UNITA operations,[65] especially in the later 1980s 
when they faced not only Angolan government troops but elements of the Cuban expeditionary 
force.[66] 




The proxy wars conducted by South Africa in Mozambique and Angola serve to confirm, albeit 
in a tentative and preliminary way, the three areas of interest, which I have indicated as the way 
forward for studies of proxy war. In terms of power and alliances, South Africa’s capacity for 
material support and occasional direct strikes against the enemies of its chosen faction, clearly 
served to constitute much of its power in the proxy relationship. On the other hand, various 
constraints on the war are also visible; the SADF could not simply fund its proxies directly, but 
rather had to assist them in setting up illegal transnational trades in ivory and diamonds for the 
purposes of supplementary funding.  
In terms of sovereignty and sovereign space, we see the South African regime shoring up 
sovereign control of its own hinterlands while intentionally subverting its foes’ ability to do the 
same; and exploiting the resulting extrasovereign spaces to conduct its war. Lastly, in terms of 
ideology, we see that far from attempting to hide its proxy war, the South African regime was 
actively involved in trying to manage its reception both domestically and abroad. 
4. Conclusion: The Ultima Ratio Regum, Remix or Redux? 
In this article, I have examined the phenomenon of proxy warfare from its origins as a 
subcategory of Cold War, superpower hostility. Furthermore, I have attempted to delineate a 
category for study by examining different forms of violence under three rubrics: military 
alliances, criminal networks and revolutionary ideologies. I have taken note of the importance of 
power and changing forms of sovereignty as framing the object of study. I have argued that the 
kinds of transsovereign uses of force which it seems sensible to call proxy wars are well 
represented (a) in the historical record, and (b) in policy and journalistic analyses of conflicts in 
Africa and elsewhere. However, at this stage of the analysis we have little basis on which to base 
a new, reinvigorated definition of proxy war such that we are able to reconcile (a) and (b), or at 
least ensure that they are talking about the same thing. 
One way to resolve this deadlock is to gather information on several representative proxy wars, 
or at least episodes of violence we suspect might be proxy wars, and analyze them for common 
characteristics.  
My own initial sweep through the data, with South Africa as the focus, indicate that eventually 
broadening the study to include data from a range of cases, will provide a much clearer picture of 
what ‘proxy war’ entails. There is an opportunity to provide a foundation on which causal 
analyses, dataset-building, or modeling of proxy wars could take place. And this highlights an 
exciting possibility for the future study of African proxy war: moving it out of the cul-de-sac of 
area studies and into the more general discussion of warfare and politics.  In illustrating how this 
might be possible, I return to this article’s title and the phrase, ultima ratio regum.  




Louis XIV, the ‘Sun King,’ was no stranger to the exercise of mass violence by the state. During 
his 72-year reign (1643-1715), France fought wars both unilaterally and in alliances, on 
continental and global scales, and against enemies ranging from Dutch rebels to the Great 
Powers of Europe. These wars featured a striking diversity within the French forces. For 
example, during the War of the Grand Alliance (or Nine Years’ War, 1688-1697), Louis and his 
ministers deployed not only their own professional soldiery,[67] but also provided financial and 
material support to armed non-state actors in Scotland and Ireland, militarized North American 
tribes as agents with which to attack English settlements, and maintained an extensive network 
of privateers for use as commerce raiders in the Atlantic and elsewhere.[68] 
For these reasons, we must suppose that when Louis ordered his cannon engraved with the Latin 
phrase ultima ratio regum, which means ‘the final argument of kings’, he did not mean that war 
could only be fought, feudal-style, by and between kings and their official designees. Instead, the 
phrase should be taken to mean that regardless of who bears the tool of war, it is the degree to 
which the ensuing violence serves the sovereign which makes it the ultimate, the conclusive, and 
the final argument of kings. It was the outcome of war, not the constitution of its forces, to which 
Louis was referring in his slogan. 
For approximately the two centuries between Napoleon and glasnost, we have existed in a world 
in which the formal war-making instruments of the state, i.e. the formal armed forces, have 
exercised a more-or-less complete monopoly over the exercise of grand warfare. Driven by 
modernizing states’ search for efficiency, the heterogeneous panoply of kings like Louis gave 
way to the homogenous Napoleonic levee en masse; because they could not be controlled, the 
privateers were first leashed, then outlawed altogether. The Louisian epoch of war, which 
focuses on the sovereign prerogative, gave way to an era in which war was a product of the state 
itself, rather than something in which the state was a patron that employed many clients. In this 
era, war both derived from and fed into the national and international evolution of the state,[69] 
and in its most high-profile incarnations it was waged in a symmetrical and legally constrained 
manner between like forces.[70] 
However, history continues to march, and as the era of state monopoly (in a variety of realms) 
has given way via globalization to the more fluid current dispensation; we once again find that 
war seems to have changed along with it. Terms like “new war”[71] or “post-heroic warfare”[72] 
are used to describe the current face of war; historians and political scientists alike discuss war in 
terms of its “transformation”[73] or a “revolution”[74] in military affairs. In Africa as elsewhere, 
the question might, however, not one of transformation but reversion: having never experienced 
the Clausewitzian epoch of state war monopoly, Africa’s wars may reflect the original and 
utilitarian view (from the sovereign’s perspective, anyway) of war embodied by Louis’s 
engraving.  
Douglas Lemke has remarked that, despite appearing to be a ‘zone of peace’ because of its low 
incidence of interstate wars, independent Africa actually has its fair share of violent conflicts 




conventional interstate terms. Like faulty smoke detectors, our analytic tools are inappropriately 
configured to detect the signs of such conflicts, or to assess their extent.[76] Scholars of African 
war have consequently tended towards the neologism in their work: instead of war as such, we 
study “resource wars,”[77] “regional conflict complexes,”[78] “state collapse,”[79] 
“heterodyadicity,”[80] or “polywars.”[81] What all these terms and their accompanying analyses 
have in common, is that they avoid the problems of studying African states at war, by moving 
their lens above or below the state. A movement above the state looks at global and structural 
forces as motivators for mass violence; a movement below the state looks at local dynamics, 
culture, and geography. 
These different perspectives are all interesting and have generated good work on African wars. 
However, if we are successful in re-invigorating the study of ‘proxy warfare’ through a more apt 
definition, we will be able to take a different route in our study of a large number of African 
wars. Rather than going above or below the state in the study of African war, we would be able 
to assess where war continues to be a form of rational state policy,[82] albeit via more or less 
covert and out-sourced means in a series of proxy wars. Such an understanding will enrich the 
debate about whether it still makes sense to define war—the final argument of kings—as a 
primarily political act, in Africa and elsewhere.[83] 
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Appendix A: African Proxy War-type Events 
I used a multi-stage process to identify a population of proxy wars in Africa.  
I began with the 2009 release of the Uppsala Conflict Database Project’s Armed Conflict 
Dataset.[84] This global dataset includes 260 conflicts split up into 1957 dyad-year observations 
between 1946 and 2008. A dyad is included if at least 25 battle deaths resulted from fighting 
between the actors involved in that year. Dyads are clustered together in discrete ‘conflicts’ 
based on the casus belli. Because of the UCDP-PRIO Dataset’s coding rules, at least one of the 
actors in any dyad (the government of the affected territory) is always a state. Restricting the 
dataset to only those conflicts occurring in Africa, reduced the dataset to 576 dyad-year 
observations of 80 conflicts.[85] 
I then further reduced the dataset to only wars involving three or more actors, regardless of 
whether these were states or non-states (e.g. rebel groups). The UCDP dataset distinguishes 
between the following kinds of actors: the government of the territory at war (Column A), those 
fighting alongside the government (Column A2, which I call ‘incumbent support’), the main 
opposition to the government (Column B), and those fighting alongside the opposition (Column 
B2, which I call ‘opposition support’). The opposition between A and B is the basis of each 
observed conflict dyad years (CDY). To meet my criteria for inclusion, a conflict had to feature 
either (a) at least one dyad in which an actor appeared in Column A2 or B2, or (b) multiple 
actors in Column B (which I call ‘opposition alliance’). This step excluded 35 wars, accounting 
for 81 CDY, from the sample. The remaining dataset included 45 wars, accounting for 495 CDY. 
Following this, I used a modified version of the Correlates of War dataset[86] to sort the 
remaining conflicts by intensity, i.e. highest level of annual fatality reached. I distinguished those 
wars with 1000 battle deaths in any single year during their entire duration, from those which 
never reached this level of fatality. This split the dataset into 25 high-intensity multi-actor wars 
accounting for 406 CDY, and 20 low-intensity multi-actor wars accounting for 89 CDY. 
Eyeballing the data at this point suggested that this step had also served to sort long-duration 
conflicts from shorter ones, i.e. that intensity and duration are positively correlated (although this 
has not been tested). This, in turn, suggested that the 25 high-intensity multi-actor wars are the 
most significant ones for the study of warfare in Africa in general. Having excluded 55 of 
Africa’s 80 violent conflicts since 1946, the fact that the remaining 25 conflicts account not only 
for the majority (70 percent) of observed CDY, but also the most high-fatality ones, argues in 




Table 1: Population of African Wars for Case Selection 






Support Start End CDY
Algeria France  FLN, MNA Morocco*[87]  1954 1961 9 
Angola Portugal South Africa* 
MPLA, FNLA, 
UNITA  1961 1974 14 
Ethiopia Ethiopia  
Military faction 
(forces of Mengistu 
Neway), EPRP, 
TPLF, EDU, EPDM, 
Military faction 
(forces of Amsha 
Desta and Merid 
Negusie) 
 1960 1991 17 
Ethiopia Ethiopia  ELF, EPLF, ELF-PLF  1964 1991 28 














1964 2008 14 
Mozambique Portugal South Africa* Frelimo  1964 1974 11 
Burundi Burundi  
Military faction 





 1965 2008 17 




Army, FAN, FAP, 
FAT, GUNT, CDR, 
Islamic Legion, 
Revolutionary Forces 
of 1 April, MPS, 
MDD, CNR, CSNPD, 
FNT, MDD, FARF, 
MDJT, FUCD, 
RAFD, UFDD, AN, 
MOSANAT, Military 
faction (forces of 
Maldoum Bada 
Abbas) 




Africa Portugal* SWAPO 
Zambia, 
Angola* 1966 1988 23 
Nigeria Nigeria Egypt* Republic of Biafra France* 1967 1970 4 




Party, Islamic Charter 
Front, SPLM/A, SAF, 
NDA, JEM, SLM/A, 
NRF, SLM/A - MM, 






(forces of Idi Amin), 
Kikosi Maalum, 
Military faction 





FUNA, NRA, UNRF, 
HSM, UPDA, UPA, 
Lord's Army, LRA, 
ADF, WNBF, UNRF 
II 






Africa* ZAPU, ZANU, PF  1967 1979 9 
Angola Angola Cuba, Namibia 
FNLA, UNITA, 
Military faction 
(forces of Nito Alves 




1975 2002 26 





Africa* 1977 1992 16 
Somalia Somalia Ethiopia 
Military faction 
(forces of Abdulaahi 




Shabaab, Harakat Ras 
Kamboni 
Ethiopia* 1978 2008 20 
Liberia Liberia  
Military faction 
(forces of Samuel 
Doe), NPFL, INPFL, 
LURD, MODEL 
Guinea* 1980 2003 12 
Cameroon Cameroon France UPC  1960 1960 1 
Chad, Libya Chad France* Libya  1987 1987 1 
Rwanda Rwanda DRC/Zaire  FPR, FDLR  1990 2002 11 




Kamajors, RUF, WSB Liberia* 1991 2000 10 
Algeria Algeria Chad, Mali, Niger 
Takfir wa'l Hijra, 
AIS, GIA, AQIM  1991 2008 18 




Chad 1993 2002 6 




Appendix B: Data Sources 
I used the following data sources to investigate South Africa’s proxy wars. 
1. South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Final Report.[88] The 
TRC reports contain primary (i.e. eyewitness) ‘evidence ... gathered of violations 
committed by South African security forces or their agents and/or surrogates in nine 
regional states—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Tanzania, and the Seychelles—and in Western Europe—in the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavia.’[89] 
2. Mayibuye Archives of the Robben Island Museum at the University of the Western 
Cape. The Mayibuye archives contain the ‘largest anti-apartheid archives in the world. 
The Archives consist of hundreds of thousands of documents, films, pieces of art, videos, 
and photographs … key collections in the Archives include those of the African National 
Congress, the International Defence and Aid Fund, the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, 
the United Women’s Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and 
personal collections of [various important liberation movement figures].’[90] My 
preliminary work in the Mayibuye Archives in June 2009 focused on reports on 
parliamentary debates, news clippings from banned newspapers, and press releases from 
NGOs and IGOs all dealing with South Africa’s undeclared war on its neighbors. 
3. SAMEDIA, the South Africa Media Institute, University of the Free State. The 
SAMEDIA archive contains newspaper clippings from regional newspapers dealing with 
South Africa’s war and proxy agents in neighbouring states.[91] Running the full gamut 
from pro-regime, to centrist, to anti-Apartheid, reports from these newspapers provided 
me both with details of battles, and with an insight into how the war was perceived 
domestically. 
4. Kommando (1949 - 1970), continued as Paratus (1970 - 1994), the official magazine 
of the South African Defence Force, housed in the Government Publications Section of 
the University of Cape Town’s library.[92] This monthly magazine, printed on 
government presses and featuring frequent op-eds by politicians and ministers, provided 
me with insight into the South African armed forces’ interaction with its proxy wars and 
co-combatants. 
5. Archive of Die Instituut vir Eietydsgeskiedenis (Institute for Contemporary History), 
University of the Free State.[93] Contains personal letters, draft speeches, and notes 
belonging to prominent members of the Apartheid regime, including State President P.W. 
Botha and Chief of the Army, General Magnus Malan. 
 
